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ABSTRACT
7Ke breaNdoZn oI tKe ÀnanciaO marNetV in 200 and tKe enVuinJ debt criViV in tKe (8 KaV produced enor-
mouV miVtruVt in ÀnanciaO productV and tKe monetar\ V\Vtem 7Ke emerJence oI VKadoZ banNinJ aOVo 
cKanJed tKe beKaYior patternV oI manaJement Vo tKat itV VeOI-intereVt dominated tKe intereVtV oI VKareKoOd-
erV and tKe otKer VtaNeKoOderV 7KeVe IaOVe incentiYeV Oed to merJer proceVVeV in tKe ÀnanciaO V\Vtem reVuOt-
inJ in marNet VtructureV in ZKicK VinJOe inVtitutionV became too biJ or too connected to IaiO 7Ke empiricaO 
deYeOopmentV and tKe poOiticaO counter-meaVureV deVcribed in tKiV articOe point to tKe Iact tKat tKe macro-
perVpectiYe KaV been dominant, neJOectinJ indiYiduaO irreVponVibiOit\ and IaiOure
Key words: capitaO IundinJ, corporate VociaO reVponVibiOit\, ÀnanciaO marNetV, principaO aJent probOemV, riVN 
management
RESUMEN
/a catda de OoV mercadoV ÀnancieroV en 200 \ Oa VubVecuente criViV de Oa deuda en (VtadoV 8nidoV produje-
ron una enorme deVconÀan]a en OoV productoV ÀnancieroV \ en eO ViVtema monetario (O Vurgimiento deO 
sector bancario en la sombra (VKDGRZEDQNLQJ, tambipn Ka cambiado los patrones de conducta de la adminis-
traciyn, de manera tal Tue los intereses de esta última dominaron los de los accionistas \ otros tenedores de 
acciones (stos Ialsos incentiYos lleYaron a Iusionar procesos en el sistema Ànanciero Tue tuYieron como re-
sultado el surgimiento de estructuras mercantiles por medio de las cuales cada institución por separado se 
Ki]o demasiado grande o demasiado cercana al Iracaso /os desarrollos emptricos \ las contramedidas polt-
ticas descritos en este arttculo apuntan Kacia el KecKo de Tue Ka dominado la perspectiYa macro, lo Tue de 
algún modo niega la irresponsabilidad \ el Iracaso indiYiduales
Palabras clave: )ondeo de capital, responsabilidad social corporatiYa, mercados Ànancieros, problemas del 
agente principal, administración de riesgos
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INTRODUCTION
7Ke Ànancial s\stem, consisting oI Ànancial marNets, banNs, and insurance Àrms, Kas 
alZa\s been KeaYil\ dependent on its clients· conÀdence in tKe sustainabilit\ oI tKe 
Ànancial products it proYides +ence, Ànancial products KaYe oIten been cKaracter-
i]ed as credence goods ZKere ´tKe sellers act as e[perts determining tKe customers· 
reTuirementsµ ((mons, 199 7Ke Iunctional capabilit\ oI sucK marNets is onl\ pre-
serYed iI tKe sellers in a mid- and long-term ensure tKe Tualit\ oI tKe products supplied 
and are able to oYercome tKe temptation to e[ploit tKe e[isting inIormation as\mme-
tr\ in tKeir sKort-term interests to ma[imi]e tKeir oZn income and ZealtK 7Ke concept 
oI corporate social responsibilit\ (CSR, deYeloped in a long process oI proIessional 
e[perience, Kas deliYered a Yalue base Ior intrinsic motiYation, ZKicK Kas been a 
certain guarantee Ior consumer protection ,I mutual trust is eroded more and more 
b\ a groZing number oI unsound sellers, Ànancial marNets become inoperable
7Ke emergence oI tKe unregulated sKadoZ banNing s\stem (6tein, 2010 and tKe 
subprime credit crisis ('iamond and Rajan, 2009 0isKNin, 2011 KaYe oIten been 
mentioned as tKe most important causes Ior tKe global Ànancial crisis 7KereIore, es-
peciall\ macro-prudential approacKes to Ànancial regulation KaYe been proposed 
(+anson, .asK\ap, and 6tein, 2011 %ut as signiÀcant as tKe macro-perspectiYe migKt 
be, indiYidual misbeKaYior oI marNet agents is anotKer important Iact: tKe Yastl\ in-
creasing number oI marNet-based Ànancial institutions Kas reTuired tKe engagement 
oI a large staͿ tKat is obYiousl\ Tuite diͿerentl\ motiYated and mucK more e[trinsi-
call\ oriented tKan tKeir peers at conYentional banNs, ZKo are subject to KigKer risNs 
to tKeir reputations 6ellers· interests in tKe Iorm oI KigK salaries and bonuses became 
dominant, and tKis beKaYior Kas also inIected tKe staͿ·s beKaYior ZitKin tKe conYen-
tional banNing s\stem 1ot onl\ KaYe tKe %asel accords, goYernment superYision, 
and regulation alone Iailed to ZorN but tKe selI-regulation tKrougK CSR totall\ collapsed 
7Ke long-term Iunctioning oI Ànancial marNets Kas been sacriÀced Ior tKe saNe oI 
sKort-term selÀsK interests oI management and staͿ
Apart Irom tKe predominatel\ macro-orientated mainstream publications on 
tKe causes oI tKe global Ànancial crisis, tKis article sKeds ligKt on tKe indiYidual re-
sponsibilities oI principals and agents :e Zill demonstrate tKat tKe beKaYioral as-
sumptions oI institutional economics deliYer not onl\ an adeTuate diagnosis Ior tKe 
micro-prudential causes oI tKe global Ànancial crisis, but also arguments Ior tKerap\ 
%eIore tKe latter is KigKligKted in more detail, Ze brieÁ\ describe tKe basic role oI tKe 
Ànancial sector as an important economic intermediar\ in section 2 6ection 3 draZs 
an alternatiYe picture oI tKe crisis, namel\ tKe abundant liTuidit\ in global Ànancial 
marNets, stressing tKe role oI Ànancial innoYations and emerging sKadoZ banNing 
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as Zell as tKe simultaneous euro implementation ZitK its impacts on tKe public debt 
in single euro]one member countries As alread\ mentioned, section 4 contributes 
some bacNground e[planations deriYed Irom institutional economics and risN man-
agement 6ection 5 draZs some important conclusions Ior deYeloping more reliable 
national as Zell as international Ànancial marNets
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE MONETARY SYSTEM, AND THE CRISIS
:itKout doubt tKe monetar\ sector pla\s an important role in tKe groZtK processes 
in KigKl\ deYeloped countries ,n real liIe, tKe risN alZa\s e[ists tKat tKe poZer oI 
one sector could become dominant and eYen endanger tKe Iuture deYelopment oI a 
Zell-balanced societal s\stem +ence, a Àrst step must be to enumerate tKe speciÀcs 
oI social responsibilit\ a second step is to determine tKe role oI tKe monetar\ s\stem 
in democraticall\-steered marNet economies and a tKird step is to identiI\ tKe causes 
oI tKe crisis oI tKe Ànancial marNets 
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY, CAPITAL FORMATION, 
AND ECONOMIC AGENTS’ BEHAVIOR
7Ke concepts oI social responsibilit\ are closel\ connected ZitK tKe etKical Iounda-
tions oI open societies )olloZing tKe approacK oI metKodological indiYidualism in 
tKe pKilosopK\ oI science, open societies are deÀned as societies ZitK GHFHQWUDOL]HG
GHPRFUDWLFGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ and a ZHOOEDODQFHGPDUNHWV\VWHP, ZKicK ensure a d\namic 
eTuilibrium betZeen tKe social goals (peace, libert\, ZelIare, and justice and tKe so-
cial instruments (Iamil\, moralit\, laZ, and marNet (Ior details see 3etersen, 1993 
and 2004 and 3etersen and 0ueller, 1999 ,n sucK a societ\, indiYidual propert\ 
rigKts pla\ a decisiYe role 7Ke indiYiduals act in barter or marNet transactions and 
generate indiYidual income, ZKicK is partl\ consumed and partl\ saYed iI tKe indi-
Yiduals possess su΀cient Kuman capital (eg, a KigK leYel oI Yocational education 
(3etersen, 2012a 2012b
6aYings are accumulated oYer time and generate eTuit\ capital, ZKicK can be 
inYested in additional Kuman capital (tKrougK IurtKer education or in real capital 
(eg, Iarmland or industrial inYestments &apable people become entrepreneurs 
ZKen tKe\ inYest capital tKe\ KaYe generated b\ tKeir oZn ZorN %esides income 
Irom labor, capital income is anotKer income source, ZKicK ensures tKe IurtKer e[is-
tence oI an indiYidual person ,t sKould come as no surprise tKat sucK an indiYidual 
82
HANS-GEORG PETERSEN AND ALEXANDER MARTIN WIEGELMANN
NORTEAMÉRICA
tries to sustain Kis/Ker eTuit\ capital and as Iar as possible eYen to increase it: tKe 
indiYidual acts in selI-responsibilit\ ,n a Iamil\ conte[t, saYings and eTuit\ capital 
pla\ a d\namic role because parents (or Iorebears not onl\ taNe care oI tKemselYes 
but also oI tKe cKildren and grandcKildren (or tKe successors tKis is tKe so-called 
intergenerational responsibilit\ ,n more comple[ modern societies ZitK elaborate 
institutional settings liNe large corporations in tKe priYate sector and representatiYe-
l\ organi]ed democratic institutions, tKe reciprocit\ ZitKin tKe Iamil\ is e[tended to 
tKe ZKole societ\, in ZKicK strong societ\ members taNe care oI tKe less capable 
members b\ implementing transIers based on altruistic elements 7Kis also reÁects 
ideas on social responsibilit\ and solidarit\ +ence, indiYidual propert\ rigKts oYer 
eTuit\ capital are complemented b\ social liabilit\, ZKicK at least in some countries 
is eYen e[pressed in tKe constitution1 7Kis social liabilit\ Kas been tKe basis Ior tKe 
deYelopment oI tKe concept oI corporate social responsibilit\, described in more de-
tail beloZ (section 4
,n comple[, democraticall\-ruled societies, in addition to tKe citi]ens, ZKo are 
tKe principals in botK tKe political and economic spKeres, tKe corporate and tKe goY-
ernment sectors must serYe citi]ens· indiYidual interests 0anagers in priYate cor-
porations as Zell as banNs, insurances companies, and public institutions are tKe 
agents, controlled Yia competition in more or less e΀cient marNets or elections in tKe 
political setting 7Ke principals need tKe best inIormation to eYaluate tKe Tualit\ oI 
agents· perIormance and to control tKeir actions ,I inIormation is as\mmetric in Ia-
Yor oI agents and control is insu΀cient, principal-agent problems (PAP arise, jeopar-
di]ing Zell-being in entire societies 
Agents start to Kide risN and misinIorm tKe principals, and decision maNing re-
garding inYestment oI eTuit\ capital and inYolYement in public aͿairs becomes 
KigKl\ di΀cult +ence, institutional arrangements (public regulations or selI-regula-
tion to ensure transparenc\ in economic and political marNets are oI utmost rele-
Yance Ior preYenting agents Irom deplo\ing e[ploitation strategies against tKe prin-
cipals ,I e΀cient regulations are sorel\ missing, Iraud and corruption destro\ 
Iairness and justice, leading to mistrust in goYernance in tKe priYate and public sec-
tor, respectiYel\
&oncrete beKaYioral problems occur iI tKe responsibilit\ Ior capital is trans-
Ierred Irom tKe oZner (sKareKolder or principals to management (CEOs or agents). 
%ecause oI as\mmetric inIormation, tKe management can deYelop its oZn interests, 
ZKicK could at least partl\ be in conÁict ZitK tKe oZners· interests. ,I management 
1  6ee, e.g., tKe *erman *rundgeset] Article 14,2: ´3ropert\ entails obligations. ,ts use sKall also serYe tKe 
public good.µ 7Ke concept oI tKe social marNet econom\ is closel\ connected ZitK tKe common ZelIare 
obligation oI priYate propert\.
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contracts are sKort-term, reporting and controlling can be misused to e[aggerate tKe 
current proÀt line tKat positiYe picture is tKen used as justiÀcation Ior salar\ in-
creases and additional bonuses, meaning KigKer costs Ior tKe Iuture and eYen endan-
gering tKe IurtKer e[istence oI tKe entire compan\. 7Ken tKe indiYidual beKaYior oI 
tKe managers (CEOs oI banNs, insurance companies, and rating agencies, asset man-
agers, etc.) conÁicts ZitK tKe collectiYe eTuit\ capital interests oI tKe sKareKolders ²
in tKe literature sucK problems KaYe been discussed in terms oI rationalit\ traps, 
prisoners· dilemma, or agents· moral Ka]ard beKaYior.
:itK tKe global Ànancial crisis in mind, responsibilit\ does not Iall on agents 
alone. 6Kort-term cKances Ior enormous proÀts KaYe also inIected tKe beKaYior oI tKe 
principals: greed and mammonism KaYe dominated oYer traditional principles Ior 
sound inYestments. +igK-interest \ields Zere not understood as indicators Ior KigK 
risNs, but Ior Kandsome proÀts and rapid propert\ groZtK. 7KereIore, tKe spirit oI 
tKe time Zas to bloZ up tKe propert\ bubble until it burst. All rational control mecK-
anisms KaYe been oYerruled b\ indiYidual misbeKaYior.                            
,I tKe ZKole Ànancial s\stem is pla\ing Russian roulette and creating ´casino 
capitalismµ (6inn, 2009), tKere is onl\ a Yer\ limited cKance Ior tKe legal s\stem to 
control misbeKaYior and Iraud. 7Kere are not enougK district attorne\s and e[pert 
inYestigators to monitor almost tKe entire national banNing and insurance s\stem 
and especiall\ not tKeir international connections. A constitutional democrac\ ZitK 
all its institutions is unable to absorb tKe sKocNs oI a moral breaNdoZn ZitKin a ZKole 
economic sector. 7KereIore, principals as Zell as agents KaYe to be seriousl\ remind-
ed tKat botK must act in an etKicall\ correct manner iI tKe Iunctioning oI Ànancial 
marNets and tKe trust in tKeir products are to be ensured Ior Iuture generations. 
7KereIore, public regulation Kas to be supplemented b\ selI-regulation oI tKe sellers 
and bu\ers in tKe Ànancial marNets, botK oI ZKom also KaYe a Iundamental interest 
in tKe (long-term) sustainabilit\ oI Ànancial marNets.
THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF MONEY, CREDIT, 
AND BANKING IN MARKET ECONOMIES
7Ke modern monetar\ s\stem is a Iundamental inYention oI manNind. 7Ke ZelIare 
oI a societ\ is created in tKe productiYe sectors, tKat is, tKe primar\ (agricultural) 
and secondar\ (industrial) sectors. :itK increasing diYision oI labor and speciali]a-
tion, tKe comple[it\ oI a societ\ increases enormousl\, so tKat a KigKl\ deYeloped 
monetar\ sector, as an important part oI tKe tertiar\ sector, is a basic prereTuisite Ior 
improYing a societ\·s groZtK potential. 7Ke implementation oI a monetar\ s\stem 
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dramaticall\ reduces tKe transaction costs oI a barter econom\ and ZorNs almost as 
a ´ lubricantµ Ior IurtKer deYelopment. 7Kere is no doubt about it: tKe Ànancial sector 
Kas contributed substantiall\ to tKe ZelIare gains in KigKl\ deYeloped societies.
%ut, as usual, tKere is a reYerse side oI tKe coin: a monetar\ s\stem Kas to pla\ a 
supportiYe role Ior tKe economic process because Zell-being is predominantl\ cre-
ated b\ tKe primar\ and secondar\ sectors. :Kile in tKe primar\ and secondar\ sec-
tors tKe eTuit\ capital oI tKe business oZner (sole trader or sKareKolder) dominates, 
tKe Ànancial sector is mucK more dependent on deposits and borroZed Iunds: tKe 
%asel ,, Accord demands minimum capital reTuirements to secure a banN·s solYenc\, 
ZKicK Kas to be betZeen 1. and 12.5 percent depending on tKe indiYidual risNs 
structure. )urtKermore banN capital is di΀cult to deÀne and KigKl\ Yolatile. 6ince 
banNs predominantl\ ZorN ZitK borroZed capital, conÁicts oI interest emerge, 
ZKicK KaYe been described b\ modern institutional economics and Zere alread\ 
mentioned aboYe: tKe PAP and moral Ka]ard.
,n a macroeconomic YieZ, net saYings taNe place in KouseKolds, ZKile tKe busi-
ness and tKe goYernment sectors are usuall\ debtors. ,n otKer Zords, tKe business sec-
tor (including tKe banNs) is acting ZitK more or less borroZed mone\ ZKile tKe state is 
totall\ dependent on ta[pa\ers· mone\. 7KereIore, in botK sectors tKe Ka]ard e[ists 
tKat tKe agents (banN managers, politicians, and bureaucrats) acting ZitK borroZed 
capital migKt Kandle it more carelessl\ tKan tKe principals (capital oZner or ta[pa\er) 
Zould ZitK tKeir oZn capital. ,I tKis Nind oI beKaYior becomes dominant, societies are 
conIronted ZitK marNet and goYernment Iailures, ZKicK jeopardi]e Zell-being and 
Iuture deYelopment. +ence, democraticall\-controlled state and international regula-
tions Ior tKe Ànancial sector (tKe banNing and insurance s\stem) are necessar\ to pro-
tect inYestors and oZners oI capital (tKe principals) against e[ploitation b\ tKe manag-
ers oI tKe Ànancial sector (tKe agents), ZKo in realit\ oIten sKoZ moral-Ka]ard beKaYior 
b\ taNing too man\ risNs ZitK borroZed capital. %ut as mentioned aboYe, agents· 
long-term interests must be stressed, eYen iI tKat Zould mean IeZer salar\ KiNes and 
bonuses in tKe sKort run. 0anagement contracts and remuneration KaYe to be orient-
ed to tKe long term to create a certain job securit\ and personal responsibilit\ so tKat 
sKort-term income interests are dominated b\ long-term reasoning.
 
CAUSES OF THE CRISIS  – TOO BIG AND TOO CONNECTED TO FAIL
A modern, e΀cient Ànancial sector steered b\ responsible Ànancial managers acting in 
tKe interests oI tKe capital oZner but also in tKeir oZn personal proÀt interests remains 
an important target oI national and international economic polic\ and regulation. 7Ke 
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abolisKment oI capital transaction controls and tKe globali]ation process KaYe broad-
ened tKe Ànancial marNets, created neZ Ànancial products, and KaYe alloZed neZ 
t\pes oI Ànancial institutions to emerge, less or almost totall\ unregulated b\ national 
superYisor\ autKorities. (speciall\ in tKe 8nited 6tates, a VKDGRZEDQNLQJV\VWHP emerged, 
ZKicK gained tremendousl\ in releYance and eYen started to dominate tKe classical 
banNing structures. ,n sucK an enYironment, ´subprime mortgagesµ (in realit\ an irre-
sponsible p\ramid or 3on]i scKeme) could be ´inYentedµ (0isKNin, 2011), ZKicK almost 
destro\ed tKe monetar\ s\stem in tKe 2008 crisis. 7Ke e[aggerated risN beKaYior oI 8.6. 
sKadoZ banNs, ZKicK initiall\ created KigK proÀts, Kas also inIected tKat oI tKe (uro-
pean banNs, ZKo Iounded tKeir oZn inYestment brancKes in tKe 8.6. 
)rom a sKort-term perspectiYe, eYen Yer\ dubious proÀts made b\ e[treme risN-
taNing increase tKe rate oI return, ZKicK induces rising marNet capitali]ation in stocN 
marNets. ,I conYentional banNs do not IolloZ suit, tKe\ lose in marNet capitali]ation 
and are in danger oI a Kostile taNeoYer. 7KereIore, more and more banNs Kad to taNe 
increasing risN positions to surYiYe in a Zildl\ accelerating Iootrace Ior a better com-
petitiYe position, Ànall\ leading into tKe near collapse oI tKe Ànancial s\stem. 7Kis 
process Zas accompanied b\ a long-term polic\ oI cKeap mone\ in tKe 8.6. created 
b\ tKe )ederal ReserYe 6\stem polic\ and initiated b\ Alan *reenspan. ,n (urope, 
tKe euro introduced in 1999 also gaYe rise to tKe Iact tKat at least in some member 
states (especiall\ tKe GIIPSC states: *reece, ,reland, ,tal\, 3ortugal, 6pain, and &\prus), 
tKe interest rate dropped dramaticall\. 7Kis resulted in greatl\ increasing public debt 
leYels, especiall\ aIter tKe 2008 crisis, ZKicK led into tKe euro]one·s 2011 crisis.
7Ke broadening oI Ànancial marNets Kas increased tKe pressures on banNs and 
insurance companies to moYe into business segments Iormerl\ in tKe Kands oI special-
i]ed Ànancial institutions (liNe inYestment banNs, priYate eTuit\ Iunds, Kedge Iunds, 
etc.). (Yen *erman banNs ZitK a Yer\ good reputation Ior small- and mid-marNet ser-
Yices temporaril\ lost interest in tKis segment and concentrated on big Àrms and in-
Yestment banNing serYices. 7Ke sKort-termed ZindIalls induced a process oI mergers 
tKat substantiall\ increased marNet concentration, posing a tKreat Ior Iuture competi-
tion. 6imultaneousl\, tKe international connections intensiÀed because oI neZ Ànan-
cial products created and bougKt b\ conYentional banNs.2 6imilar processes KaYe taN-
en place all oYer tKe Zorld resulting in ´s\stemicµ banNs. 2n tKe one Kand, tKese 
institutions are considered too big to Iail, because banNruptc\ oI a single banN Zould 
noZ endanger tKe e[istence oI tKe national Ànancial s\stem. 2n tKe otKer Kand, tKese 
institutions are also too internationall\ connected to Iail, ZKicK Zould endanger tKe 
supranational or eYen global Ànancial s\stem. All tKis Zas accompanied b\ more or 
2 )or tKe increase in connectedness aIter tKe crisis, see 3eli]]on (2014).
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less ine΀cient superYisor\ mecKanisms, especiall\ totall\ insu΀cientl\ regulated rat-
ing agencies, ZKicK are priYate Àrms. 7Kis led to an increasing number oI e[perts and 
citi]ens losing conÀdence in Ànancial institutions despite tKe Iact tKat Ànancial prod-
ucts are predominantl\ ´credence goodsµ as mentioned aboYe.
THE EMPIRICAL PICTURES OF THE CRISIS
7Ke international capital marNets KaYe been cKaracteri]ed b\ KigK and increasing li-
Tuidit\ in recent decades, especiall\ aIter e[tensiYe liberali]ation as a conseTuence oI 
tKe Iall oI tKe ,ron &urtain. Additionall\, tKe periods oI consolidation in tKe budgets oI 
tKe 8.6. under tKe &linton administration and tKe 8. induced innoYations in tKe À-
nancial marNets to proYide Ior alternatiYe inYestment products. 7Kese deYelopments 
strengtKened tKe leYerage eͿects and enlarged credit potentials in tKe priYate sector. 
,ncreasingl\ risN\ Ànancial products accompanied b\ tKe introduction oI tKe neZ cur-
renc\ in (urope (tKe euro) led to tKe Ànancial crisis, in ZKicK tKe e[ploding public 
debt in tKe euro]one Kas contributed additional risNs to an alread\ gloom\ prospect.
LIQUIDITY AND THE CRISIS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
%eginning in tKe earl\ 1990s, groZing rents in tKe raZ-material-producing countries 
particularl\ Áooded tKe international Ànancial marNets, ZKicK Kad just been almost 
totall\ liberated aIter tKe 1990 cKange. Additionall\ a long period oI strong econom-
ic groZtK Zas obserYed in tKe emerging BRICS (%ra]il, Russia, ,ndia, &Kina, and 
6outK AIrica). 7Ke raZ-material-producing and emerging countries Zere not able to 
absorb all tKe e[port surpluses in tKeir oZn countries, so tKeir goYernments and/or 
banNs looNed Ior proÀtable inYestments especiall\ in tKe KigKl\ deYeloped industri-
al nations. AlternatiYe inYestment in tKe reall\ need\ deYeloping countries (oIten 
´Iragile statesµ) (3etersen, 2010) did not taNe place because oI a supposedl\ lacN oI 
´inYestment securit\,µ so tKeir groZtK remained comparatiYel\ moderate.  
)igure 1 demonstrates tKat since tKe beginning oI tKe 1990s, tKe saYings rates oI 
tKe oil-e[porting and emerging economies strongl\ increased, ZKile tKose in tKe ad-
Yanced economies sloZl\ decreased. )igure 2 sKoZs tKat tKe decline oI tKe saYings 
rate Kas been especiall\ sKarp in ,tal\, -apan, and tKe 8nited .ingdom. :Kile tKe 
8.6. saYings rate also Iell to about one percent in 2005, it recoYered aIter tKe 200/2008 
collapse.
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Figure 1
GROSS SAVING RATE DYNAMICS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
Figure 2
HOUSEHOLD GROSS SAVINGS RATE IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES 
AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP
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%otK Àgures giYe clear Kints tKat tKe e[cess oI saYings oYer desired inYestment 
in tKe past tZo decades Zas absorbed in tKe KigKl\ deYeloped countries, tKe 8.6. 
and European Union member states.3 +ere, inYestment predominantl\ Zent into 
neZ Ànancial products and goYernment bonds. 7Ke e[cess liTuidit\ and tKe cKeap 
mone\ polic\ in tKe U.6. and Europe establisKed tKe Tuestionable incentiYe Ior re-
ducing saYings in tKe KigK deYeloped countries and increasing tKeir Ioreign debt. 
FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AND SHADOW BANKING
7Ke loZ-interest polic\ oI tKe )ederal ReserYe 6\stem ()ed) and tKe European &en-
tral %anN (ECB) conseTuentl\ caused strongl\ decreasing rates oI return on goYern-
ment bonds so tKat international inYestors on tKe global Ànancial marNets searcKed 
Ior proÀtable inYestment at KigKer rates oI return, ignoring tKe Iact tKat KigKer rates 
oI return are onl\ possible b\ taNing KigKer risN positions. +ere, Ànancial innoYa-
tions came into pla\. 1umerous neZ Ànancial products Zere inYented to attract tKe 
e[cess suppl\ oI capital:
 ³ single securiti]ations (e.g., asset-bacNed securities >ABS])
— multiple securitizations (e.g., collateralized debt obligations [CDO])
— securitization-based deriYatiYes (e.g., credit deIault sZaps [CDS])
— re-securitization and re-K\potKecation.
Additionall\, neZ Ànancial institutions emerged or KaYe greatl\ gained in in-
Áuence. &onYentional or commercial banNing Zas supplemented b\ a sKadoZ banN-
ing s\stem (marNet-based Ànancial institutions liNe Kedge Iunds, structured inYestment 
YeKicles, inYestment banNs, priYate eTuit\ Iunds, mone\ marNet Iunds, insurers, 
etc.), ZKicK conduct credit transIormation outside national banNing regulations and 
accords (e.g., %asel , and ,,). 7Ke Ànancial innoYations as Zell as tKe neZ Ànancial 
institutions Zere becoming increasingl\ comple[ so tKat inIormation about tKe real 
risN structures oI tKe diͿerent inYestment products Zas more or less Kidden. 7Kis 
Zas especiall\ true Ior multiple securitization structures, ZKere eYen e[perts Zere 
not able to eYaluate tKe products· Tualit\. 7Kis Kas been demonstrated b\ Ialse eYal-
uations b\ tKe rating agencies (6tandard 	 3oor·s, 0ood\·s, )itcK Rating), interest-
ingl\ all U.6. priYate companies. 2bYiousl\ tKere Kas been no product liabilit\ Ior 
3  )or a critical anal\sis oI ´ e[cess saYingµ see 2bstIeld and RogoͿ, 2009 6erYen and 1gu\en, 2010 and %orio 
and 'is\atat, 2011.
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Ànancial products eitKer on tKe national or tKe international leYel, ZKile product li-
abilit\ Ior industrial products is Yer\ stringent eYen internationall\.
7Ke empirical deYelopment in tKe U.6., ZKicK signiÀcantl\ contributed to tKe 
Ànancial crisis oI 200/2008, is sKoZn in )igures 3 and 4. )igure 3 demonstrates tKat 
since 1985, tKe sKadoZ banNing s\stem (suppl\ing tKe ´Ànancial innoYationsµ) Zas 
increasingl\ important. 7Ke groZtK oI largel\ unregulated ABS issuers outpaced tKe 
groZtK oI regulated conYentional banNs· securit\ emissions in 2008, tKe Yolume oI 
tKe sKadoZ banNing sector reacKed its peaN ZitK about U620 trillion compared to tKe 
conYentional banNing sector ZitK about U611 trillion. 
Figure 3
GROWTH OF SECURITY EMISSIONS IN U.S. FINANCIAL SECTORS
1 ABS issuers include conduits such as special-purpose vehicles.
Source: &EDERAL 2ESERVE "OARD 	 AND 7IEGELMANN 	
7Ke so-called true-sale securitizations are diYided into tKe conYentional ABSs 
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Conventional ABSs consist oI broadl\ di-
versiÀed and Komogenous credits tKeir credit ZortKiness can usuall\ be estimated 
b\ actuarial matKematics. +oZever, CDO is an umbrella term Ior structured bonds, 
collateralized b\ mucK more Keterogeneous assets liNe credits oI private companies 
partl\ traded on tKe stocN e[cKange, illiTuid propert\, real estate credits (collateral-
ized mortgage obligations or CMOs), pa\ment reTuests Ior automobile loans, credit 
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card loans, student loans, consumer credit, public debt titles, etc. Additionall\ CDOs 
tKemselves Kave been securitized again (re- or even multiple-securitization), so tKat 
Ior investors tKe risN structures Zere usuall\ totall\ Kidden. )igure 4 represents tKe 
breaNdoZn oI true-value securitizations in tKe U.6. and tKeir development since 1985. 
7Ke Àgure illustrates tKat until tKe Ànancial crises, subprime mortgages permanentl\ 
gained in importance, and tKe same is true Ior tKe CDOs. +oZever, especiall\ KigKl\ 
comple[ and risN\ products dominated tKe marNet Ior true-sale securitizations.
Figure 4
"2%!+$/7. /& 53 425%3!,% 3%#52)4):!4)/.3
1 Especially CDOs.
Source: 3ECURITIES )NDUSTRY AND &INANCIAL -ARKETS !SSOCIATION 	 AND 7IEGELMANN 	
+ence, establisKed mecKanisms Ior e΀cient individual risN management Zere 
no longer useIul. At least tKe KigKer \ield Ior some oI tKe products Zas a rougK Kint 
tKat tKe risNs involved Zere steadil\ increasing. And all tKis Kappened ZitKout an\ 
inIormation or Zarnings to investors. /iabilit\ and responsibilit\ considerations ob-
viousl\ did not e[ist on tKe side oI tKe product innovators and no product recall ²as it is 
usual Ior deIective products in tKe industrial and consumption goods sectors² Kas 
ever Kappened.
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EURO IMPLEMENTATION, THE CRISIS OF CREDITS, 
AND EXPLODING PUBLIC DEBT
3arallel to tKis period oI product innovations on Ànancial marNets and tKe U.6. cKeap 
mone\ polic\ to overcome tKe 2000 e[plosion oI tKe dot-com bubble (collapse oI tKe 
´1eZ 0arNetµ), tKe European currenc\ zone Zas implemented. 7Ke cKeap mone\ 
polic\ is reÁected in tKe development oI tKe Iederal Iunds rate, sKoZn in )igure 5.
Figure 5
53 &%$%2!, &5.$3 2!4% 	
Source: &EDERAL 2ESERVE "ANK OF 3T ,OUIS 	
7Ke Iederal Iunds rate decreased steadil\ Irom tKe 1980s on (also reÁecting de-
clining inÁation rates) and almost reacKed zero percent in tKe crisis \ears 200/2008.
7Ke crisis oI credits emerged in several steps:
—  7Ke aggressive subprime mortgage polic\ oI tKe U.6. sKadoZ banNing s\stem 
(including European subsidiar\ companies, liNe 'eutscKe %anN and man\ 
*erman ´ /andesbanNenµ) led to loZer lending standards and KigK-risN mort-
gage products (liNe adjustable-rate mortgages)
—  7Ke limitation oI mortgage liabilit\ on Kousing in tKe U.6. tKere is no joint 
and several liabilit\ Ior individuals liNe in man\ European countries4
4 7Ke slogan is, ´'rop oͿ \our Ne\s at tKe banN and get rid oI tKe liabilit\µ
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—  0alIunctioning oI rating agencies tKat overlooNed tKe massive problems, es-
peciall\ in tKe sKadoZ banNing s\stem
—  7Ke real estate bubble (3onzi or p\ramid scKeme) as a conseTuence oI care-
less or even irresponsible policies and investment beKavior
—  %reaNdoZn oI tKe overKeated real estate marNets in tKe U.6. and Europe as 
Zell as tKe collapse oI tKe sKadoZ banNing s\stem
—  ,nIection oI commercial banNs and insurance companies, ZKicK Keld value-
less securities (especiall\ CDOs)
—  2verreaction oI tKe rating agencies in doZn-grading tKe government debt 
titles in tKe U.6. and Europe
—  Collapse oI real economic activities in single countries accompanied b\ sig-
niÀcant monetar\ and Àscal polic\ reactions
—  'ecreasing GDP and increasing interest pa\ments on government debt in-
duced enormous budget deÀcits
—  7Ke enormous increase in reIunding needs in some EU member states caused 
even stronger rising interest rates
— ,ndividual countries came close to banNruptc\ (GIIPSC)
— Crisis oI conÀdence in tKe euro s\stem
— ,mplementation oI Ànancial rescue-paracKutes.
.eeping in mind tKe development in tKe eurozone, tKe implementation oI tKe 
euro, especiall\ tKe convergence process beIore tKe implementation pKase, reduced 
inÁation and improved stabilit\ in most oI tKe participating EU member states. )igure 
 demonstrates tKat tKe process to introduce tKe euro Kad an enormous impact on in-
terest rates in tKe countries oI tKe eurozone Ze cKose tKe net \ields oI 10-\ear govern-
ment bonds as an e[ample. ,t becomes obvious tKat tKe euro implementation dramati-
call\ reduced interest pa\ments on government bonds especiall\ in tKe GIIPSC states. In 
tKe \ear oI tKe introduction oI tKe casK euro, 2002, interest rates in almost all member 
states oI tKe zone dropped to tKe *erman level. And tKe spread in betZeen tKe interest 
rates remained ver\ close until tKe beginning oI tKe crisis in tKe Àrst KalI oI 200.
7KereIore, tKe implementation oI tKe euro led to a strong decrease in interest 
structures in all tKe member countries ZitK tKe e[ception oI *erman\, ZKicK alread\ 
Kad ver\ moderate interest rates due to tKe 'eutscKe %undesbanN·s stringent mon-
etar\ polic\. 7Kis decline in national interest pa\ments ZorNed liNe a business stim-
ulus pacNage, ZKicK caused a boom at least in some member countries, ZKereas 
*erman\ remained in stagnation until tKe measures oI tKe Agenda 2010 developed 
tKeir Iull positive impacts.
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7Ke loZ interest rates Kave not onl\ inÁuenced economic activities in tKe mem-
ber countries, but also induced tKe governments to increase tKeir public debt be-
cause oI tKe cKeap mone\ tKat Áooded international Ànancial marNets. As a conse-
Tuence, Ioreign debt dramaticall\ increased, ZKicK at least Ior a certain period Zas 
Kidden because oI tKe continuing moderate interest pa\ments in public budgets. %ut 
iI tKe public debt e[ceeds a level oI betZeen 0 and 80 percent in relation to GDP, in-
creasing interest rates usuall\ cause a dramatic KiNe in tKe interest pa\ments so tKat 
e[ploding budget deÀcits surIace. +ence, tKese developments induced an increased 
Keterogeneit\ in tKe eurozone and tKe EU. A process oI divergence oI economic indi-
cators, especiall\ internal inÁation rates, began.
6ince 200/2008, tKese processes Kave step b\ step and mucK too sloZl\ been 
internalized b\ tKe rating agencies, ZKicK abruptl\ cKanged tKeir policies and si-
multaneousl\ caused a sudden collapse oI trust in governments· abilit\ to manage 
sucK a crisis. 7Ke reÁection on tKe international Ànancial marNets Zas an e[plosion 
oI tKe risN component in compound interest rates, ZKicK also Kappened in tKe euro-
zone and is depicted in )igure  as Zell.
Citizens in tKe GIIPSC countries increased consumption levels even more, bougKt 
goods and services in tKe IeZ stable countries in tKe eurozone ()inland, *erman\, 
/u[embourg, and tKe 1etKerlands), and a real e[odus oI capital Irom tKe GIIPSC states 
Figure 6
.%4 9)%,$ /& 9%!2 '/6%2.-%.4 "/.$3 ). 3/-% %52/:/.% 34!4%3
Source: 7IKIMEDIA #OMMONS 	 
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to tKe stable states occurred. 7Kis is clearl\ e[pressed in tKe so-called target2 balanc-
es, ZKicK reÁect tKe imbalances oI services and capital movements oI tKe single 
member states.5 )igure  sKoZs KoZ, since summer 200, tKe Iormerl\ negligible 
target2 balances practicall\ e[ploded and reacKed tKeir peaN in -ul\/August 2012. 
6ince tKen, tKe ma[imum gap, especiall\ betZeen *erman\ and 6pain but also YLVj-
vis tKe otKer member states oI tKe eurozone, Kas diminisKed sligKtl\.
Figure 7
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7Ke sligKt reversal trend in tKe target2 balances since Iall 2012 is also reÁected in 
tKe development oI government bonds· net \ield. 7Ke implementation oI tKe Euro-
pean Ànancial rescue paracKutes (6ecurit\ 0arNet 3rogram [SMP] oI tKe ECB, European 
)iscal 6tabilit\ )acilit\ [EFSF], European 6tabilit\ 0ecKanism [ESM], European )iscal 
Compact [EFC], European )inancial 6tabilisation 0ecKanism [EFSM]) Kave obviousl\ 
temporaril\ calmed doZn tKe actors on tKe international Ànancial marNets so tKat 
long-term interest rates Kave also dropped ²ZitK some interruptions² since Iall 2012 
(see )igure 8). 
5 )or more details on tKe target 2 balances see, Ior e[ample, 6inn (2012).
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Figure 8
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2nl\ tKe Iuture Zill tell iI tKe political measures being implemented Zill be suI-
Àcient or not. An economic polic\ in tKe individual member countries tKat reduces 
public deÀcits and tKe interest burden in budgets seems to be tKe onl\ Ieasible course 
Ior consolidating and gaining bacN tKe trust in national governments. All tKe discus-
sions on groZtK enKancements up to noZ Kave been pure rKetoric, because nobod\ 
Kas been able to e[plain KoZ sucK programs can be Ànanced ZitKout endangering 
tKe Iuture again ² despite tKe Iact tKat sucK concrete programs are badl\ lacNing.
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INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AS A BACKGROUND EXPLANATION
Economic tKeor\ Kelps to e[plain ZKat Zent Zrong especiall\ in tKe last tZo or tKree 
decades oI real liIe. 7Ke aIorementioned approacKes oI institutional economics liNe 
tKe principal-agent problem (PAP) are oI utmost relevance as is demonstrated in tKe 
IolloZing section.
As long as management onl\ relies on eTuit\ capital, no PAPs e[ist Ior tKe most 
part. Even iI tKe entrepreneur Kas limited inIormation (especiall\ about Iuture trends), 
Ke/sKe develops Kis/Ker oZn e[pectations based on e[perience and arrives at Kis/Ker 
oZn management decisions regarding e[pected risNs. In tKe simple neoclassical setting, 
Ke/sKe tries to ma[imize Kis/Ker proÀts, assuring or even broadening Kis/Ker eTuit\ 
capital basis. +e/6Ke is interested in sustainable development and even voluntaril\ 
internalizes negative e[ternal eͿects, IolloZing tKe rules oI Iairness (in a RaZlsian sense) 
and even ensuring inter-generational responsibilit\ in a Iamilial as Zell as societal con-
te[t Ke/sKe is acting as a decent tradesman (´eKrbarer .auImannµ), ZKicK in tKe *er-
man literature Iorms tKe basis Ior tKe concept oI corporate social responsibilit\ (.linN, 
2008). 7Kis idealized conte[t Kas to be compared ZitK modern economic structures, 
ZKere sole-traders and small enterprises still e[ist but borroZed capital and comple[ 
organizational structures pla\ a dominant role. %orroZed capital oIten cKanges tKe con-
ditions Ior responsible beKavior because borroZed capital Zas Iormed Irom tKe savings 
oI tKird persons. 7Kis alone migKt inÁuence an investor·s risN-taNing attitudes.
7Ke bacNground Ior sucK a beKavioral impact is tKe so-called leverage eͿect, 
ZKicK reÁects tKe level oI borroZed capital. Usuall\ tKe return on eTuit\ in a Àrm is 
KigKer tKan tKe marNet interest rate (tKe so-called risN-Iree interest rate).  II an inves-
tor can earn 10-percent interest on an investment in Kis/Ker oZn Àrm and tKe marNet 
interest rate is just 5 percent, borroZing is rational because tKe proÀt is increased b\ 
tKe 5 percent oI tKe investment Ànanced Irom borroZed capital. II tKis proÀt is added 
to tKe proÀt on tKe eTuit\ capital, tKe return on eTuit\ increases Irom 10 percent at 
assumed 100 000 currenc\ units oI eTuit\ capital and zero borroZed capital to 15 per-
cent at 50 000 currenc\ units oI eTuit\ capital, to even 30 percent at 20 000 currenc\ 
units oI eTuit\ capital to inÀnite at zero eTuit\ capital (see )igure 9). 7Ke leverage eI-
Iect is even boosted iI tKe e[cess eTuit\ capital can be invested in similar investment 
projects tKat oͿer tKe same return. At an eTuit\ investment oI 10 000 currenc\ units 
per investment, 10 investment projects oI 100 000 currenc\ units eacK can be Ànanced 
so tKat tKe proÀt increases Irom 10 000 currenc\ units in tKe case oI 100-percent eTuit\ 
Ànancing to 55 000 currenc\ units in tKe case oI 10-percent eTuit\ Ànancing. 7KereIore, 
it seems rational to emplo\ borroZed capital, but tKis use is connected ZitK substan-
tial risNs dependent on tKe eTuit\/borroZed capital ratio.
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7Ke entrepreneur is alZa\s conIronted ZitK tKe risN tKat Kis/Ker return on eTui-
t\ migKt not be sustainable but could decrease in tKe Iuture. In tKe case oI using bor-
roZed capital, an additional risN arises: iI tKe rate oI return declines, tKe borroZer can 
no longer service tKe debt (interest pa\ment and amortization oI tKe borroZed capi-
tal). 1oZ it depends on tKe risN e[pectations and evaluation oI tKe single entrepre-
neur iI tKe input oI borroZed capital cKanges Kis/Ker attitudes about risN taNing. 
/ong-term e[perience and some empirical evidence seem to prove tKat tKe input oI 
debt capital increases tKe Zillingness to taNe KigKer risNs especiall\ in cases ZKere 
limited liabilit\ e[ists (e.g., limited liabilit\ companies and joint stocN companies).
Figure 9
%15)49 #!0)4!, "/22/7%$ #!0)4!, !.$ 2%452. /. %15)49
Source: Own calculations.
7Ke input oI borroZed capital combined ZitK limited liabilit\ arrangements al-
read\ sets incentives Ior investors to taNe more risNs tKan in tKe case oI Iull eTuit\ 
Ànancing. II tKen tKe intrinsic motivation stemming Irom etKical paradigms liNe tKe 
´decent tradesmanµ is buried in oblivion and no longer communicated as a leading 
image, tKe obstacles Ior risN-taNing beKavior are eroded more and more. 
As long as man\ economists are oI tKe opinion tKat moralit\ and etKics are just 
problems oI pKilosopK\ and not part oI dail\ economic liIe, it is no Zonder tKat critical 
developments in our societies are coming to tKe surIace and into people·s conscious-
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ness. 6ince tKe ver\ beginning oI tKe tKeor\ oI economic tKougKt, economists Kave 
been Iull\ aZare tKat serious marNet Iailures do e[ist, ZKicK must be overcome b\ eI-
Àcient governmental regulation. %ut iI marNet Iailures are not cured and tKen are ac-
companied b\ moral Iailures oI tKe agents acting in tKe marNets (tKe suppliers and 
demanders oI goods and services), tKe entire social and economic s\stem could even 
be jeopardized. 2nl\ H΀FLHQWJRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWLRQV (´good governanceµ) and educa
tion in fundamental values can prevent us Irom sucK catastropKes.
AnotKer risN Ior spreading moral Iailures is to be seen in tKe comple[ economic 
structures tKat e[ist in modern economic s\stems. 7Ke sole trader and tKe personal 
entrepreneur rel\ing on eTuit\ capital and selI-responsibilit\ are still Tuite t\pical in 
some Kapp\ countries ZitK a large sector oI small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) but in all KigKl\ developed countries, big incorporated companies ZitK so-
pKisticated organizational structures dominate. )or reasons oI simplicit\, )igure 10 
sKoZs some oI tKe comple[ governance relations.
II governance decisions are delegated to managers, in terms oI modern institu-
tional economics, agents emerge ZKo manage tKe oZner·s eTuit\ capital or, in case 
oI corporations, tKat oI tKe sKareKolders, ZKo are tKe principals in our approacK. 
3rincipall\ tKe managers (or tKe board oI directors or cKieI e[ecutive o΀cers [CEOs@) 
Kave to act in tKe interests oI tKe sKareKolders to ma[imize tKe sKareKolders· value. 
In social-marNet-oriented societies liNe *erman\, staNeKolders· interests are also le-
gall\ ensured (´0itbestimmungsgesetzµ or Co-'etermination Act see )igure 10) to 
saIeguard tKe common ZelIare obligation oI private propert\. 7Ken additional 
agents appear on tKe scene representing sometKing otKer tKan tKe oZners· interests. 
0anagers are not solel\ acting in tKe interest oI sKareKolders, but developing strong 
interests oI tKeir oZn, especiall\ interests to ma[imize tKeir oZn ZealtK. In e[treme 
cases, tKese interests become dominant so tKat tKe eTuit\ capital bases oI tKe sKare-
Kolders ma\ even be destro\ed (e[ploitation oI tKe sKareKolders b\ tKe manage-
ment). %ut tKis is onl\ one PAP; man\ otKers are also involved. 
7rade union o΀cials, ZKose main tasN is to represent tKe interests oI emplo\ees 
(ZKo are tKe principals in tKat relationsKip), also develop tKeir oZn incentives, 
ZKicK ma\ conÁict ZitK tKose oI tKeir clients. Certainl\, a trade union representative 
in a supervisor\ board or even a board oI directors develops Kis/Ker oZn interest 
Ior KigKer remuneration. Also, numerous PAPs can be involved in tKe relationsKips 
betZeen supervisor\ board, sKareKolders, and managers. +ence, comple[ gover-
nance structures are inevitabl\ connected ZitK multi-stage PAPs.
  0arNets are just societal instruments liNe etKics iI tKe agents (suppliers and/or demanders) on tKe marNets 
are acting immorall\, marNet outcomes Zill be immoral, too. )or details see 3etersen (1993: 128, 138).
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Figure 10
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE IN GERMANY
A speciÀc e[ample oI a collapse oI corporate social responsibilit\ can be seen in 
tKe previousl\ described crisis oI tKe Ànancial marNets (Ior details see 3etersen 
[2012c@).  As alread\ mentioned, a modern, e΀cient Ànancial sector steered b\ re-
sponsible Ànancial managers acting in tKe interests oI capital oZners but also in tKeir 
oZn personal interests remains an important target oI national and international eco-
nomic polic\. 7Ke abolisKment oI capital transaction controls, tKe globalization pro-
cess itselI, and tKe implementation oI inIormation tecKnologies broadened Ànancial 
marNets, created neZ Ànancial products, and gave rise to neZ t\pes oI Ànancial insti-
tutions, less or almost completel\ unregulated b\ national supervisor\ autKorities. 
Investment traders and banN managers on sKort-term contracts misused tKeir 
mandates predominantl\ in tKeir oZn income and propert\ interests and conse-
Tuentl\ destro\ed trust in tKe Ànancial s\stem, ZitK Iar reacKing conseTuences Ior 
Iuture development. And all tKat Kappened despite tKe Iact tKat all tKese institu-
tions, ZKetKer private, partl\ in a public-private-partnersKip (PPP), or totall\ public, 
Kad etKical guidelines and corporate social responsibilit\ declarations in tKeir com-
pan\ presentations.
  6ee, Ior e[ample, 'eutscKe %anN·s internet presentation (n.d.), 7Kis Kas not prevented 'eutscKe %anN·s CEOs 
and asset managers Irom pla\ing a ver\ Tuestionable role during tKe subprime mortgage K\pe in tKe U.6. 
6ee tKe 2012  'HU6SLHJHO exposé.
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7KereIore, complexit\ must be reduced, transparenc\ increased, and inIormation 
s\stems substantiall\ improved. 0anagers Kave to be reminded oI tKe guiding prin-
cipal oI a decent tradesman, so tKe\ IolloZ tKe obligations oI corporate social respon-
sibilit\ once again. 7Ke\ need to internalize tKe traditional NnoZledge tKat Ànance 
and banNing depend on tKe clients· trust in tKe monetar\ s\stem. 7Kis alloZs principals 
to regain control over tKe s\stem and redevelop tKe necessar\ trust ZKicK is indis-
pensable Ior Iuture groZtK and ZelIare. %ut tKis recover\ Kas to be accompanied b\ 
more e΀cient public (macro-prudential) regulation, ZKicK must be implemented 
globall\ even b\ countries liNe tKe U.6. and tKe U., ZKere tKe reluctance to taNe sucK 
measures is still mucK too strong.
CONCLUSIONS
%otK tKe economic and political s\stems urgentl\ need e΀cient rules and regulations, 
ZKicK Kave been extensivel\ discussed in political and economic tKeor\. 7Ke neces-
sar\ tecKnical conditions are more or less obvious toda\ because positive examples 
exist. %ut even in tKese cases, serious sKortcomings prevail, as tKe 200/2008 Zorld 
Ànancial crisis demonstrated. 7Ke predominantl\ Zell-NnoZn tecKnical conditions 
oIten do not Iunction because Kuman beings displa\ serious sKortcomings ZitK re-
gard to tKe internalization ²or internalize insu΀cientl\² oI tKe underl\ing value s\s-
tem. 7Kis is due to tKe Iact tKat in man\ discussions tecKnical conditions predomi-
nate, ZKile tKe etKical Ioundations oIten remain ambiguous. Almost ever\ corpora-
tion Kas its oZn CSR guidelines, ZKicK all sound Tuite convincing and are usuall\ part 
oI tKe compan\ presentation. %ut tKis oIten remains a pure marNeting strateg\ ZitK 
no conseTuences in real actions. 7Ke most prominent example is tKe beKavior oI tKe 
managers as agents oI banNs and insurance companies, ZKo sKould be Iull\ aZare 
tKat Ànancial marNets onl\ Iunction in tKe long run ZKen tKe respective actors trust 
eacK otKer and are also su΀cientl\ trusted b\ tKe public. 7Ke s\stem inevitabl\ col-
lapses iI tKis trust is destro\ed. 7Kat Kas not Kindered most agents Irom beKaving liNe 
lemmings to protect tKeir selI-interest over tKeir principals· interests. Certainl\, sKort-
term ZorN contracts created some Tuestionable negative incentives, but tKere Kas 
also been massive criminal impetus.
II one discusses ZitK tKe predominantl\ \oung Ànancial broNers and traders, it 
becomes obvious tKat tKeir motivation is ver\ similar to tKat ZKicK dominates in 
anotKer Àeld oI dail\ liIe: proIessional sports. 7Ke\ Zant to earn tKe KigKest return 
in tKe sKortest possible period ²most oI tKe leading international soccer clubs are al-
most banNrupt. 7Ke international Ànancial s\stem is not a casino, and ´casino capi-
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talismµ (6inn, 2009) as executed in recent \ears destro\s tKe ver\ basis oI democrat-
ic, marNet-oriented Iree societies. :Kat is badl\ needed is a general outcr\ Ior a neZ 
etKical Ioundation oI politics and economics even in our KigKl\ developed countries 
and all over tKe Zorld. II computers and matKematical algoritKms replace Kuman 
beings in Ànancial marNets ²tKis is called electronic trading and banNing², not sur-
prisingl\, social responsibilit\ Kas Iallen victim to tecKnical progress. %ut tKis tecKni-
cal progress destro\s tKe ver\ basis oI our societies. :e Kave to reduce complexit\ 
and develop more sNepticism about eas\, Tuasi-automatic solutions. 
7Ke lessons one can learn Irom tKe last Ànancial crises are maniIold. 7Ke Ànancial 
sector as part oI tKe service sector Kas developed too strong selI-interests expressed in 
extraordinar\ rates oI returns, salaries, and bonuses: tKe selI-interest oI agents prevail 
over tKe oZnersKip interests oI principals. 7KereIore, tKe Ànancial sector·s role Kas 
become more and more relevant, almost displacing not onl\ tKe oZners· interests but 
also political inÁuences. 7Ke Ànancial sector Kas to be reduced to its classical role oI 
serving tKe real econom\ regulated b\ strong national states and international organi-
zations. Agents in tKe Ànancial sector must IolloZ a personall\ binding code oI con-
duct so tKat tKe people·s trust in Ànancial institutions is saIeguarded and not sacriÀced 
Ior sKort-term individual advantages.
0ost importantl\, arbitrage and speculation are oIten instruments to improve 
marNet conditions and move toZard eTuilibrium. +ence, speculation in Ànancial mar-
Nets ma\ positivel\ impact goods marNets and increase ZelIare. In tKe case oI as\m-
metric inIormation and excessive poZer on tKe suppl\ side, agents are able to induce 
price KiNes b\ artiÀciall\ increasing demand, as Kappened ZitK subprime mortgag-
es beIore tKe 200/2008 crises. Underl\ing 3onzi scKemes evoNe price bubbles,8 
ZKicK eventuall\ burst and migKt even destro\ Iormerl\ Zell-Iunctioning marNets. 
CrasKes oI Ànancial marNets can inIect goods marNets and drag tKe real sector into 
recession. 7Kis Nind oI speculation destro\s Zell-being tKereIore, countermeasures 
Kave to be implemented in tKe Iorm oI macro-prudential solutions Ior monetar\ polic\ 
and regulation.
%ut agents· long-term selI-interests sKould also be directed against ZelIare-de-
stro\ing speculation. In spite oI tKe Iact tKat tKe media Kas named some ´Keroesµ as 
Kaving Àrst detected tKe coming Ànancial marNet crasK, almost ever\ merel\ reason-
abl\ inIormed economist Kad all tKe necessar\ inIormation about tKe Iundamental 
diseTuilibrium in tKe U.6. mortgage s\stem and be\ond. %ut tKis NnoZledge did not 
stop agents Irom bloZing tKe bubble up as long as possible because tKeir intrinsic 
motivation Zas dominated b\ Ialse incentives. 7KereIore, Ànancial experts sKould 
8 )or examples oI price bubbles see 9an %oening, :illiams, and /a0aster (1993).
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put more eͿort into developing strategies tKat in tKe Iuture Zill saIeguard tKe stabil-
it\ oI national as Zell as international Ànancial marNets. :Kat is important is no long-
er innovations oI neZ complex Ànancial products important, but ratKer tKe imple-
mentation oI corrective measures, ZKicK Zill serve tKe long-term interests oI tKe 
clients so tKat trust in tKe Ànancial sector is restored. 6ucK measures include Tualit\ 
labels Ior Ànancial products, certiÀcations, international product liabilit\, and reli-
able, re-producible, and independent rating procedures. /iabilit\ and product recall 
b\ issuers Zould be clear signals oI tKe degree oI reliabilit\ (and tKe risNs involved) 
and Zould improve transparenc\. +ence, consumers· protection is in line ZitK tKe 
Iundamental selI-interests oI Ànancial agents because it ensures tKe long-term Iunc-
tioning oI tKe marNets. 9oluntar\ product guarantees are a Iorm oI micro-prudential 
regulation corresponding to CSR obligations and substituting tKe need Ior mucK strong-
er regulator\ measures b\ state autKorities.
7Ke concentration process ZitKin tKe Ànancial sector Kas to be stopped b\ appro-
priate regulation to secure su΀cient competition among tKe diͿerent institutions oI 
tKe banNing and insurance sector. 2rienting exclusivel\ to big clients (large enter-
prises or ricK individuals) Kas to be corrected in Iavor oI a banNing and insurance 
scKeme in ZKicK tKe average citizen is tKe Iocus oI Ànancial services. A combination 
oI savings, cooperative, and private banNs is oI utmost relevance. 7Ke old *erman 
´Kouse banNµ s\stem Kas been a good example. 3rivate clients and Àrms Kave orga-
nized tKeir debit and credit relations using a single banN, and tKe banN managers Zere 
perIectl\ inIormed about tKeir credit risNs independentl\ oI otKer agents (liNe tKe rat-
ing agencies). 7Ke %asel Accords Kave partl\ destro\ed tKis s\stem, ZKicK is oI special 
value Ior tKe SME sector. %ut in tKe meantime, at least tKe smaller Ànancial institutions 
Kave realized tKat ZKile sucK a s\stem ma\ lead to a decreasing rate oI return, it also 
increases saIet\ in investments tKrougK trust.
+ence, tKe SME sector needs corresponding small and medium-sized banNs (SMB), 
ZitK managers closel\ connected to tKe clients and Iamiliar ZitK tKeir individual 
risN proÀles. 0aniIold securitization brings enormous inIormation losses and tKe 
risN oI misuse. 0ulti-agent s\stems Iormed b\ sKadoZ banNs and rating agencies 
suͿer Irom serious PAPs, di΀cult to control adeTuatel\ b\ governmental regulation. 
7Ke inÁuence oI misled, inadeTuatel\-controlled agents contributes to speculative 
bubbles and p\ramid and avalancKe eͿects so tKat tKe Iundamental economic data are 
no longer oI relevance Ior stocN marNets and Àrms· capitalization. 6Kort-term specu-
lative interests tKen endanger tKe long-term Zell-being oI ZKole societies.
In developing and emerging countries, SMEs as Zell as SMBs must be supported 
in tKe development process until tKe\ Iorm tKe bacNbone oI tKe econom\ and dis-
pla\ sustainable business models. Conventional banNing metKods Kave to be com-
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bined ZitK modern Ànancial products, ZKicK must be cKaracterized b\ an adeTuate 
rate oI return and a transparent risN/reZard ratio. Cooperative credit institutions 
acting in tKe interest oI banN clients are also a promising approacK Ior limiting tKe 
inÁuence and tKe concentration ZitKin tKe globalizing marNet. 7Kis mainl\ creates 
advantages even Ior smaller lenders to gain access to international capital and to over-
come situations oI national capital sKortages. %ut just as important as an e΀cient SMB 
s\stem is citizens· trust or mistrust in tKe national s\stem oI governance.
/ast but not least, tKe European currenc\ s\stem Zill onl\ survive iI tKe leading 
politicians in tKe eurozone are courageous enougK to emancipate tKemselves Irom 
tKe U.6. and tKe U., botK oI ZKicK obviousl\ Kave diͿerent interests and concepts oI 
tKe role oI Ànancial marNets in tKeir respective economic s\stems. Europe badl\ 
needs a Ànancial arcKitecture oI its oZn to separate risN proÀles into conventional 
banNing, investment banNing, and KigK-risN areas, in ZKicK tKe super-ricK can pla\ in 
tKe ´casino st\le.µ 2I utmost importance is monetar\ polic\ returning to a ´sound 
polic\µ tKat guarantees a positive real interest rate in tKe medium- and long-term per-
s pective. 2nl\ at a positive real interest rate are tKe necessar\ savings incentives set 
Ior individuals, ZKo are reTuired to overcome tKe problems oI demograpKic cKange b\ 
partl\ capital-Iunded insurance scKemes. 7Ke Iuture oI social securit\ in our societies 
is jeopardized ZitKout a strong compound-interest eͿect in tKe private and public 
insurance scKemes. 7KereIore, as soon as possible, tKe ECB Kas to cKange its current 
cKeap-mone\ polic\.
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